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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-4727 
____________ 
 
JOHN LOTT; SHEILA GANTZ;  
BEAR MOUNTAIN REALTY 
 
v. 
 
JAMES S. DUFFY,  
    Appellant 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-13-cv-02768) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 12, 2014 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 4, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant James Duffy appeals from an order of the District Court remanding an 
action against him to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will dismiss the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirm in part. 
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 Plaintiffs John K. Lott and Sheila Gantz, trading as Bear Mountain Realty, 
commenced an action in ejectment against defendant-appellant James Duffy in the Court 
of Common Pleas of Adams County, which was settled.  The settlement provided that 
Duffy would release any claim, interest, or title to the subject property, and would vacate 
the property within ninety days.  Instead of vacating the property, Duffy filed a Chapter 7 
petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  Lott and Gantz moved to lift the automatic stay of their state court 
ejectment action, and the Bankruptcy Court granted this motion.  The Chief Bankruptcy 
Judge ordered and decreed that the automatic stay was terminated with respect to the 
subject property, and that the ejectment action in state court could proceed.  Duffy’s later 
attempt to reimpose the automatic stay failed.      
 Lott and Gantz then returned to state court to enforce the settlement by initiating 
contempt proceedings against Duffy.  On June 7, 2013, the state court scheduled a 
hearing on the motion for contempt.  In response, Duffy removed the ejectment action to 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, D.C. Civ. No. 
13-cv-01580.  Duffy alleged that removal was proper because of a procedural due process 
issue concerning whether he had received proper notice of the contempt action and/or the 
lifting of the automatic stay.  Lott and Gantz filed a motion to remand the matter to state 
court, contending that the Notice of Removal was filed more than 30 days after service of 
the initial pleading in the ejectment action, and that the Notice of Removal was defective 
in that there was no basis for federal jurisdiction.  In an order entered on October 30, 
2013, the District Court remanded the matter to the Adams County Court of Common 
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Pleas, concluding that the ejectment action presented no federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and noting that a case may not be removed to federal court where a federal claim 
would arise only as a defense to a state-created action, see Franchise Tax Bd. of 
California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).  The District 
Court awarded attorneys’ fees to Lott and Gantz, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), in the amount 
of $350.00 because Duffy failed to advance any objectively reasonable grounds to 
support his claim of federal question jurisdiction, Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 
U.S. 132, 141 (2005) (court may award attorneys’ fees as part of remand order where 
removing party lacked objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal).  Duffy did not 
appeal this order of the District Court.   
 On November 13, 2013 – two days before he was scheduled to be evicted – Duffy 
filed another Notice of Removal in federal court relating to the state court ejectment 
action.  Duffy alleged equal protection and due process violations in connection with an 
“imminent threat of arrest and loss of property,” and claimed that the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), which authorizes removal 
of a state court action “[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts 
of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the 
United States.”  The Notice of Removal was assigned a new civil action number, and Lott 
and Gantz moved to dismiss it on the ground that the District Court’s prior remand 
determination should not be disturbed by Duffy’s invocation of §§ 1343 and 1443(1).  In 
an order entered on November 14, 2013, the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion 
and awarded attorneys’ fees against Duffy in the amount of $420.  The court determined, 
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as before, that the Adams County action in ejectment did not involve a federal question, 
and that Duffy did not have an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.  In 
addition, the court concluded that Duffy did not meet the requirements for removal under 
§ 1443(1) because he did not allege a violation of his constitutional right to racial 
equality, and he did not allege facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that he 
had been denied or could not enforce his constitutional right to racial equality in the state 
courts. 
 Duffy appeals.  He argues in his brief that we have jurisdiction to review the 
District Court’s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) because removal in the first 
instance was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).  He also argues that the District Court erred 
in awarding attorneys’ fees.1 
 We will dismiss the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirm in part.  An 
order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed generally is not 
reviewable on appeal.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 153 
                                              
1 Duffy has also argued that, once the federal court issues a certified copy of the remand 
order, it is completely divested of jurisdiction over the pending state action, see Trans 
Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 1995), and that, absent a 
certified copy of the District Court’s October 30 remand order, the state court was 
without jurisdiction to proceed on the contempt issue.  See Appellant’s Pro Se Brief, at 8-
11.  We note that, following the District Court’s October 30 remand order in D.C. Civ. 
No. 13-cv-01580 relating to Duffy’s first Notice of Removal, he filed in that same action, 
on November 19, 2013, an item titled “Emergency Motion for the Return of Parties 
Status Quo,” in which he advised the District Court that no certified copy of the remand 
order had ever been received by the Adams County Prothonotary.  The District Court 
denied this motion on November 21, 2013, and rejected Duffy’s argument about the 
effect of a lack of formal certification.  Duffy did not timely appeal this order, see Fed. R. 
App. Pro. 4(a)(1)(A) (proving for 30 days in which to appeal), and, accordingly, we lack 
jurisdiction to review it, Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (timely filing of 
notice of appeal in civil case is jurisdictional requirement).  
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F.3d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1998).  Section 1447(d) provides for an exception where the case 
was removed from State court pursuant to § 1443(1) governing civil rights cases, but, 
here, the District Court’s remand order was based on a lack of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The plaintiffs’ state court ejectment action contained no civil rights count or 
claim and plainly could not have been filed initially in federal court; thus the exception 
set forth in § 1447(d) does not apply.  See Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 
780, 784 (3d Cir. 1995).  A defense based on federal law does not establish federal 
question jurisdiction for removal purposes, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 
399 (1987).  “[A] federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, and … the 
plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard 
in state court.”  Id.  The ejectment action filed by Lott and Gantz is governed by state 
law, see Soffer v. Beech, 409 A.2d 337, 340-41 (Pa. 1979), and does not present a federal 
question.  Accordingly, the matter belongs back in state court.     
 Moreover, as explained by the District Court, section 1443(1) will support 
removal only when the civil rights at issue involve matters of racial equality.  Georgia v. 
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966).  See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 
(1975).  Section 1443(1) applies only in rare cases.  See Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 
1048-49 (3d Cir. 1997).  To succeed at removal on this basis, a state court defendant must 
allege a deprivation of rights guaranteed by a federal law providing for specific civil 
rights stated in terms of racial equality.  See id. at 1047.  There was no allegation in the 
District Court of racial discrimination, and Duffy does not seriously contest this issue on 
6 
 
appeal in stating generally that removal petitions may be filed by members of the 
Caucasian race, see Appellant’s Pro Se Brief, at 16.  
 Here, the District Court acted within its authority in determining that the ejectment 
action presented no federal question and in determining that removal was not proper, 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”), and, therefore, appellate 
jurisdiction is lacking, see Feidt, 153 F.3d at 126 (“[W]e repeatedly have held that section 
1447(d) bars review of remand orders based upon the types of subject matter 
jurisdictional issues which district courts routinely make under section 1447(c).”).  See 
also Cook v. Wikler, 320 F.3d 431, 434 (3d Cir. 2003) (same).   
 We will affirm the order of the District Court to the extent of the award of 
attorneys’ fees.  Although § 1447(d) precludes us from reviewing the District Court’s 
remand order for purposes of reversing it, we may review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
the District Court’s award of attorneys’ fees under § 1447(c).  See Roxbury 
Condominium Ass’n Inc. v. Anthony S. Cupo Agency, 316 F.3d 224, 227 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291).  “The appropriate test for awarding fees under § 1447(c) 
should recognize the desire to deter removals sought for the purpose of prolonging 
litigation and imposing costs on the opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ 
basic decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general matter, when the 
statutory criteria are satisfied.”  Martin, 546 U.S. at 140.  Therefore, whether fees are 
awarded should turn on the reasonableness of the removal.  See id. at 141.  Duffy’s 
second Notice of Removal was plainly unreasonable given the District Court’s 
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disposition of his first Notice of Removal.  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees in the amount of $450.00. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal in part for lack of 
jurisdiction and affirm in part. 
